Deep Routeing and the Making of ‘Maritime Motorways’: Beyond surficial geographies of connection for governing global shipping by Peters, K
1 
 
Deep Routeing and the Making of ‘Maritime Motorways’: Beyond surficial 
geographies of connection for governing global shipping  
Kimberley Peters, University of Liverpool, Accepted Version in Geopolitics 
 
Abstract 
Geography has turned to towards the seas and oceans with much attention being paid to ‘water 
worlds’ through socio-cultural, political and environmental lenses. Geo-economic analysis in 
particular, has considered the role of containerisation, the port, and global logistics flows 
central to the contemporary shipping industry. However, where routeing enters discussion these 
debates remain ‘surficial’ with a focus on the rationale of lines of connection which are mapped 
onto the sea (rather than into the sea, as a liquid, three-dimensional, motionful space). This 
paper challenges considerations of ship routeing that only skim the surface. This paper adds 
depth to the discussion. It is argued that ship routeing is not a purely surficial exercise of 
charting a voyage across seas and oceans. Routes have a geo-politics predicted at times on the 
water’s depth, the topography of the ocean floor and seabed and marine resources. Drawing on 
a variety of examples, notably the traffic routeing scheme – or ‘maritime motorway’ – 
governing the flows of shipping in the Dover Strait, UK, this paper brings a ‘wet ontology’ and 
three-dimensional analysis to ship routeing. It is contended that such a recognition and 
discussion of deep routeing is necessary to shed light upon the often invisible processes sea 










On Monday 14th August 2017, the flow of shipping traffic into and out of the port of Antwerp, 
the second largest port in Europe, literally ground to the stop. The China Shipping Container 
Lines (CSCL) vessel, the MV Jupiter became ‘stuck’ in a shallow area – the Bocht van Bath of 
the River Scheldt – as it left port, enroute for Hamburg with 14,074 containers (Torfs 2017). 
Resulting from a mechanical failure which impacted the ability of the captain to manoeuvre 
the ship correctly, the ship, travelling at 12 knots, ran aground on the shallow bank avoiding 
what could have been a much larger disaster. Without the sandbank to halt the vessel, it was 
on course to plough into the small riverside village of Bath (Torfs 2017). Yet its grounding was 
disaster enough. The vessel, of 155,000 gross tonnes and 366 meters in length had blocked the 
main arterial thoroughfare in to the Port of Antwerp (Voytenko 2017). Such was the size of the 
vessel that traffic in the area had to be ‘suspended with more than 10 inward and outward 
vessels blocked’ in the process (ibid. 2017).  
Containers and the increasingly large ships that transport them at sea are the behemoths 
of the global economy. The integrative system of cargo transportation devised by Malcolm 
McLean in the late 1950s would change the speed and efficiency of global logistics and fuel 
the ‘just-in-time’ economy (Birtchnell, Savitzky and Urry 2015, 5), which is now central to our 
daily existence (Levinson 2016; Martin 2016). Indeed, almost everything we own – 
approximately ‘90 percent’ of goods – move A to B via ships (George 2013). This is alongside 
the increased size of bulk carriers such as tankers that carry the raw materials also vital to 
everyday life. Any breakdown in this global infrastructural system of containerised vessels and 
bulk carriers due to disabled routes has severe ramifications for our world of global 
connections. It impacts the movement and subsequent delivery and supply of goods that 
underscore contemporary society and the economy. The incident in Antwerp was significant 
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because, occurring at low tide – and with a first re-floating attempt failing – it would be a 
twelve hour wait for the gravitational pull of the moon in respect of these European waters, to 
offer a high tide to shift and move the vessel. Indeed, surrounded by tugs to secure the Jupiter, 
and a team of port operators working out how and when the vessel could be re-floated, the 
channel was passable – for what is in ‘shipping-time’ a long time – to only smaller vessels in 
daylight hours (Torfs 2017).  
The blockage created by the grounded vessel was significant, and more so given that 
globally, not all ports provide route-ways in that can handle the very largest vessels such as the 
MV Jupiter. This meant that those ships of a similar size that were unable to dock in Antwerp 
during the blockage could not be rerouted. As the Director of Global and European policy at 
the Freight Transport Association would note on the day of the incident,  
 
These are very big ships and there are only a relatively small number of ports that can 
take them, so if there are other ultra large container ships in the Port of Antwerp then 
clearly that’s a problem, they can’t get in or out, other ships trying to access the port 
are also denied that opportunity… the option of switching to other ports is problematic 
as there are so few ports that can take them… and it becomes a problem if they (the 
companies) cannot get access to the containers and for the delays that occur in getting 
the containers and the goods to customers. (Welsh 2017, np)  
 
On the one hand, the incident with the MV Jupiter could be read as a story of 
infrastructural breakdown, analysed through unpacking the failing technology of the ship itself 
(following Graham and Thrift 2007). On the other hand, it could be considered through 
unpacking the importance of shipping routes as more than simply flat lines on a map that lead 
ships across the seas and oceans and through river-ways to port. The incident with the MV 
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Jupiter is a story of a ship that went ‘off-piste’; a ship that deviated from a route causing a 
grounding with economically catastrophic results. In deviating from a set, governed route, we 
are alerted that routes, whilst often appearing as lines laid on to a map, or on the surface of the 
sea, relate also to what is under sea, at depth. As Torf (2017, np) noted of the Antwerp incident, 
‘while the Scheldt estuary may look extremely wide, the passageway for big ships is very 
small’. Indeed, only a narrow portion of the river is navigable to the very largest of vessels due 
to variable areas of subsurface depth. From the surface it would be impossible to tell what areas 
were ‘safe’ and which should be avoided. Indeed, the water’s depth only became apparent when 
the system failed and the ship hit the solidity of the river bed. The stark materiality of the 
stranded ship would become a marker of shallow depth.  
Developing from this example, this paper contends that more attention must be paid to 
routeing – to the invisible lanes etched across the oceans, seas – and indeed into inland water 
courses – that ships forge, form and follow. Routes are as fundamental to globalisation as the 
material technologies of ships and their cargo. It is ‘safe’ routes – recommended and governed 
corridors – which invisibly keep ships and their cargo moving. ‘Maritime motorways’ or traffic 
separation schemes are a particular type of ‘safe’ route that steward shipping in the narrowest 
and shallowest oceanic ‘bottlenecks’ worldwide (see Peters 2016). The term ‘traffic separation’ 
refers to the division of vessels into designated ‘lanes’ so that all traffic in a given lane is 
travelling in the same direction (thus preventing head on collisions). However, ships are not 
just horizontally or surficially separated and ‘spaced’. Traffic separation is also a vertical 
exercise. Maritime motorways are also defined by depth with the aim of separating the invisible 
subsurface depth of a vessel with the sea floor.  
Given that a deviation of a route can ‘break’ a network of flows entirely, wrecking 
havoc on the just-in-time flows of global shipping, this paper argues the need to take routeing 
seriously. Yet it also argues we cannot just skim the surface of such an investigation. There is 
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a need to deepen discussions. Indeed, much has been explored in respect of contemporary 
shipping, ships routes and the global ‘connectivity’ they create (Heins 2015; Hesse and 
Rodrigue 2004; Lobo-Guerrero 2012; Martin 2013; Nooteboom and Rodrigue 2008; Rodrigue 
and Nooteboom 2010). Moreover, historically, the routes of vessels have been ways of tracking 
the socio-cultural and political worlds of colonialism and imperialism (Anim-Addo 2014; 
Armitage and Braddick 2002; Featherstone 2005; Lambert 2005; Ogborn 2005). Yet the very 
nature of what a route is remains unquestioned. Routes are taken for granted as stubbornly 
surficial phenomena; fixed lines marked across a surface (Steinberg 1999). But the sea is not 
just a surface. As Steinberg and Peters have noted (2015, 248), the sea is ‘indisputably 
voluminous, stubbornly material, and unmistakably undergoing continual reformation’. 
Although it is vital to take surfaces seriously, for they too have different “subtles”, “densities” 
and “varieties” (see Forsyth et al. 2013), the sea has three-dimensional depth; it has material 
form as (most often, but not always) a liquid; and it is in constant motion (see also Bear and 
Eden 2008; Peters 2012; Phillips 2018; Squire 2017). If we apply a so-called ‘wet ontology’ to 
an understanding of routeing, how might we rethink vessel routeing and in turn the geo-
economics of global connection and more so, the geopolitics and governance of how ships then 
navigate these routes in our seas, oceans and waterways?   
Accordingly, the paper will unfold in the following way. Next, a theoretical context to 
the discussion will be provided. It will begin with an overview of the growth of global shipping 
in the middle of the twentieth century and the challenges this process has created for ship 
routeing in respect of depth, before outlining previous work on the sea and routeing that has 
been predominantly ‘surficial’ – focused on networks, flows and lines of connections. 
Following from this, the paper will draw from three years of research into ship routeing in the 
Dover Strait, UK to deepen the discussion of ship routeing. It was here in the Dover Strait that 
the first Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) or ‘maritime motorway’ routeing system was 
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designed and implemented. Using this example, the fundamental role of routes as drivers of 
the global economy will be demonstrated. Moreover, it will be argued that there is a need to 
see such routes ‘in 3D’ – as predicated on understandings of variable depth and sub-surface 
hazards. The research conducted consisted of extensive archival work tracing the transnational 
formation of traffic routeing measures in Dover (which were subsequently replicated 
worldwide – albeit differently depending on the waterway concerned and its specific 
underwater bathymetry, tidal depth and in relation to maximum ship draught). This was using 
files from the Foreign Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Industry and Ministry 
of Defence (held in the National Archives, UK), together with records from the Lloyds 
Shipping Register; Dover Local Studies Collection and the library of the Royal Institute of 
Navigation (RIN). This archival work was alongside observations at the Maritime Coastguard 
Agency and interviews with staff who monitor the globally significant ‘motorway’ through 
‘the Channel’, as well as those responsible for major ports that line the way. This example will 
unpack and posit the value of thinking with a ‘wet ontology’ – of thinking through water’s 
depth, liquidity and motion – to better make sense of contemporary shipping and how it 
functions to bring us that ‘90 percent’ of everything (George 2013).  
 
Global shipping and the predominance of surficial approaches to routeing 
Recent work in geography has sought to pay attention to water worlds, sea-based mobilities 
and the fluid spaces of maritime transit (see Anderson and Peters 2014; Anim-Addo, Hasty and 
Peters 2014; Steinberg 2009). Yet such studies have focused largely on the stubbornly material 
technologies of ships and the material cargo that is moved (Birtchnell, Savitzky and Urry. 2015; 
Hasty and Peters 2012), rather than that which can’t be so obviously seen – the routes such 
ships follow – often recommended or enforced – to ensure those ships and their cargo travel as 
safely and securely in the sometimes physically and politically volatile space of the sea. That 
7 
 
there has been such a predominant focus on ships, cargo – and notably containers – is 
unsurprising. By the mid-1960s ‘the world... (had) become organised in a different way’ 
(Parker 2013, 370) – this because of the growth in global shipping and the invention of the 
container: a box of standard dimensions. Of course, commodities have always moved globally 
via ships – from the movements of gifts of exchange made by pre-modern societies in the 
Pacific Ocean (Malinowski 1921), to the global trade in slaves across the Atlantic from the 
1700s (Rediker 2007), to convict transportation from the UK and Ireland to Australia (Peters 
and Turner 2015), to the many goods shifted as worldwide links opened up by the technologies 
of sail, and then steam and then oil. But the container – or what Birtchnell, Savitzky and Urry 
call ‘Cargo Mobilities’ (2015) have radically assisted in the shrinkage of the world (Massey 
2001). The container would eradicate the labour intensiveness, time and cost, of loading and 
unloading ships compared to the era preceding its invention (Martin 2016). The container – or 
TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) has revolutionised the movement of goods creating new 
surfaces of connection (Levinson 2016). By loading goods into a standard ‘box’, more goods 
can now be transported more efficiently. Moreover, the ‘compatibility’ of the box, which has 
standardised dimensions with uniform interlocking corners, means boxes can be easily stacked 
together onto ships, thus maximising space available, before then being transferred by cranes 
to trains and trucks also configured for the smooth transfer of containers. The system reduces 
the ‘dead time’ in the transporting of goods, as they move continuously from ship, to shore 
(Birtchnell, Savitzky and Urry 2015, 5). As Heins has summarises then ‘containizeration helps 
make our world, at least in terms of economics, trade and commerce, into a more unified and 
cohesive entity’ (Heins 2015, 346).  
Whilst the growing volume of geographic work on containers has been important, it has 
obscured other maritime processes essential to how global (maritime) trade operates. Deborah 
Cowen (2014) has disrupted the notion that things ‘just’ move in the containerised world by 
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exposing the harsh labour violations that are bound up with the global shipping trade, especially 
in a world where what happens, out at sea, is often invisible and obscured, and where even with 
the presence of flag nation protection and international law, rules and regulations are flouted 
offshore (Urry 2014; Peters 2011). Martin has likewise showed how such smooth efficiencies 
allow for easy infiltration for smuggling (2016). This paper disrupts existing work further.  
Firstly, although an incredibly simple technological development (Martin 2016, 32), 
much attention has been directed to the ‘box’ as the driver of global trade, given they are, as 
Parker describes, such ‘iconic’, ‘material’, ‘things’ (2013, 382). This has resulted in an 
omission in much geographic literature regarding the crucial role of bulk carriers – which are 
the predominant ‘movers’ of global trade1 (Peters 2016). In turn, this paper pays attention to a 
range of vessels fundamental to the ‘90 per cent’ of everything that moves (George 2013).  
Secondly, literature on containerisation has been fundamental in creating the ‘2D’ or 
surficial ontology that dominates understandings of how vessels voyage around our world. As 
Martin (2013) and Nooteboom and Rodrigue (2008) explain, containerised transport is 
predicated on eliminating friction and creating smooth ‘surfaces’ of integration between land 
and sea – truck, train and ship – to create a connected network where things move “seamlessly” 
across space (Martin 2013). Containerisation, Martin posits, creates a ‘global surface’ of 
connection (2013, 1023, emphasis added). Whilst a careful reading of Martin reveals that this 
surface is a product of eliminating frictions, which includes eradicating a lack of depth that 
prevents smooth flows (notably shifting ports from shallower areas that bigger container 
vessels cannot access to deeper, ‘out of town’ ports, ibid. 2013, 1022), the argument remains 
that global shipping has created a flat ontology of connection and an understanding of global 
                                                          
1 In 2010, only about 23 per cent of the 90 per cent of trade moved by ships is moved by container. The majority 
of goods shifted are ‘bulk’ including liquid bulk movement (oil) and dry goods (such as grain) (World Ocean 
Review 2010).  
9 
 
trade as driven by surficial flows. This has dominated much work on the seas and oceans more 
generally. Indeed, as Steinberg notes, maps of the ocean illustrate it as ‘blue, flat and 
unchanging: stable in both space and time’ (2013, 159). Moreover, from the era of industrial 
capitalism when the seas opened-up to more intense trading, they would become ‘idealized as 
… empty transportation surface(s)’ to be crossed as quickly as possible for capitalist gain’ 
(Steinberg 2001, 113). This understanding of the seas has dominated until quite recently 
(Steinberg and Peters 2015).  
Thirdly then, whilst this ‘flat ontology’ (to borrow from Marston, Jones and Woodward 
2005), has been a common feature of work on maritime flows, networks and connections (both 
in historical and contemporary work, Lobo-Guerrero 2012; Martin 2013; Nooteboom and 
Rodrigue 2008; Ogborn 2005; Rodrigue and Nooteboom 2010), an explicit discussion of routes 
or routeing has been oddly absent, or bundled up with the surficial discussions of global 
linkages that create the global ‘“conveyor belt”’ of trade (Airriess 2001, 236, in Martin 2013, 
1022). In sum then, it is the container, the ship, and its connected technologies that have been 
taken, almost indisputably, to ‘make our global world’ (to borrow from Heins 2015, 246). It is 
these that forge and form our world of connection through seamless, surficial travel. It is ships 
that bring us every item we wear; shoes on our feet, watch on our wrist, phone in our pocket, 
food on our plate, car that we drive (Peters 2010). Yet all of this renders the role of routes – 
and such routes as anything other than surficial – invisible in understandings of global 
connection (Peters 2016). Arguably containerisation, alongside increases in bulk and tanker 
shipping movements, have brought with it busier seas with bigger, faster ships. This presents 
a greater threat of collision with other ships and with subsurface geophysical hazards – in turn 
weakening and slowing down supply chain linkages. Moreover, bigger ships have deeper 
draughts to ensure the correct balance and weighting with cargo or ballast. These ships cannot 
access all ports, nor travel smoothly through all waterways as the earlier example of the Jupiter 
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proved (see also Sys et al. 2008 on the relations between ship size and port operations). 
Acknowledging routes – and moreover routes as more-than-surficial – is essential to making 
sense of our global world of connection – contributing to and theoretically deepening debate 
beyond the visual and material; beyond the ship and its load. 
Work that considers the depth of the seas is currently taking hold. Although studies of 
oceanic depth – or bathymetry – has long featured in the physical sciences (as well as benthic 
studies of populations under the water’s surface, see Hillebrand et al. 2010), alongside studies 
in engineering and design, operations and management which have attended to technical 
elements of ship draught (or depth) in relation to trade and port access (Sys et al. 2008; 
Veldman et al. 2005), in recent years geographers have sought to explore human and more-
than-human geographies below the surface of the water, with a variety of underwater 
(Merchant 2014), immersive (Squire 2017) geographies. Topics of study have stretched from 
embodied geographies of touristic experience (Straughan 2012; Nash 2013), to the territories 
of underwater employed in Cold War geopolitics (Squire 2016, 2018). Further work has 
considered the importance of non-human underwater-worlds; of fish (Bear and Eden 2008), to 
even the smallest of microbial life (Helmrich 2009). More recently, scholars have attended to 
resource extraction from under the surface of the seas (see Bond, Diprose and Thomas 2018; 
Phillips 2018). In this respect, a 3D perspective can add much to our understandings of crucial 
‘goings-on’ at sea. As Peters has written, 
 
There is certainly potential to consider the underwater in a myriad of ways (through 
imaginative accounts, shipwrecks or consumption practices) and these possibilities can 





However, routeing as an expression of the navigational ordering of space and the harnessing 
of control of the ocean has remained a largely at surface-level for the geographers who are 
increasingly seeking to make sense of various political, economic and socio-cultural human 
engagements with water-worlds (Anderson and Peters 2014). 
That said, ‘deeper’ work has already taken hold in studies of other elemental spaces 
through which movement happens. This has followed the ‘opening up’ of a vertical axis in 
recent geographic thinking – upwards to the sky, and downwards to the sub-terrain – 
challenging the long held horizontal or ‘areal’ bias of the much spatial understanding (see Adey 
2010; Elden 2013; Graham and Hewitt 2013; Weizman 2003). In Elden’s pivotal work (2013, 
35, my emphasis) he asks, how thinking with ‘height and depth instead of surfaces’ can unlock 
new knowledge of spatial politics. In this provocative and important piece, Elden (2013) urges 
scholars to think with ‘volume’. Here there is not a binary division between horizontal and 
vertical, above or below, surface or sub-surface. Rather, space is configured in ‘3D’ (Bridge 
2013).  
In Weiqiang Lin’s work on air traffic routeing he adopts this ‘3D’ ontology (following 
from Elden 2013 and building on Adey 2010) to make sense of the ordering of global airplane 
transportation (2016a, 2016b, 2014). Aeroplanes do not, as Lin notes, simply move through the 
sky at a set level. The skies are populated by working out ‘aircraft separation’ the horizontal, 
as well as vertical ‘gaps’ that keep aircraft moving safely – throughout the volume of air – to 
prevent collision (Lin 2018, 42). As Lin explains,  
 
[i]n an age when the skies are increasingly saturated with aircraft, these buffers re-
rationalise airspace as an orderly geometric body with vertical, lateral, and longitudinal 
error thresholds calculated in terms of the minimum distance required between aircraft 
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on top of each other, between aircraft to the side, and between successive aircraft, 
respectively. (Lin 2018, 42) 
 
By adding a ‘3D’ ontology, or ‘aerial ontology’ to thinking about travel above us, we can make 
better sense of how our global world of aviation functions where increasing demand calls for 
busier skies, and in turn methods of routeing and separation needed to maintain this intensity 
of transportation.  
Although Steinberg and Peters (2015) have taken Elden’s call ‘to sea’ arguing for an 
attention to volume, movement and materiality in oceanic politics, studies of shipping, routeing 
and logistics in geography remains largely surficial. The approach Lin has taken to making 
sense of the air has not been unpacked in relation to the seas. Yet in the maritime world – where 
oceans are ever busier (as is exemplified when attention is drawn to pinch-points and 
bottlenecks such as the Straits of Dover, Malacca, Singapore and so on) and where shipping is 
essential to global trade movements – an attention to movement beyond surface, to a ‘3D’ or 
‘wet ontology’, may add much insight into the governance of an industry vital to society and 
the economy. The paper now turns to such a discussion.  
 
Deepening discussion: subsurface geographies of ship routeing 
The Dover Strait: An introduction 
The water that lays between Britain and France – ‘the Channel’, or more specifically, the 
narrowest point – the Dover Strait – was formed by ‘high interglacial sea levels that led to 
marine flooding of … shallow shelf areas’, separating a previously ‘connected’ continent 
(Gupta et al. 2017, 2) creating, in recent times, one of the most significant passages of water 
on the planet (Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) 2014). In both World Wars it was a 
strategic territory to defend and control, and in peace-time has become a fundamental space of 
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trade and commerce (Unwin 2003). Linking northern Europe and the Atlantic World, providing 
a funnel to the coasts of the Americas and Africa, it has always been, and still remains, one the 
major global waterways for shipping traffic (MCA 2014). Over 400 vessels above 300 gross 
tonnes negotiate it daily (MCA 2014) on a north-south, south-north through-passage. This is in 
addition to frequent west-east, east-west ferry crossings, the navigation of small crafts, and the 
presence of dinghies and unorthodox use (such as cross Channel swimmers). In addition to the 
volume of traffic that moves through the area, which at its narrowest is ‘18 nautical miles’ 
(Kaimes Beasley MCA, Interview 2016), the Dover Strait, due to its formation is, at points, 
incredibly shallow. A number of long sandbanks litter the Channel, including the Sandettié, 
Varne and Bullock Banks; the Goodwin Sands, South Falls and Ruytingen. As Kaimes Beasley, 
Maritime Operations Controller at the MCA noted, these ‘topographical features’ alongside the 
‘sheer numbers’ creates a number of ‘risk factors’ (Interview 2016). The major risk is of 
collision – with another vessel in the crowded waterway or with a sub-surface, invisible hazard 
– a sandbank or ridge.  
 Consequently, the passageway through the Dover Strait is ordered through a routeing 
mechanism known as a ‘Traffic Separation Scheme’ (TSS) or ‘maritime motorway’, dividing 
shipping traffic into two streams (MCA 2014). Traffic heading south-west to the Atlantic is 
channelled adjacent to the British coast. Traffic heading north-east to the ports of Europe is 
routed adjacent to the French coast. The scheme is mandatory for all vessels over 300 tonnes 
that are traversing the Channel. That a mandatory scheme for routeing exists in the Dover Strait 
raises questions of territorial governance, given its status as an ‘international’ waterway and 
thus not subject to the laws governing either Britain or France, but those of the United National 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although maps depicting the TSS illustrate it as a flat maritime 
motorway, with two-dimensional surface lanes, the routeing scheme was devised, negotiated 
and now operates based not just on movements ‘across’ the water, but through it. It was a 
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scheme predicated on depth. In the remainder of this section, the development of the world’s 
first TSS or maritime motorway will be unpacked. Routeing, it will be showed, is not just a 
surface-level, horizontal exercise of splitting shipping traffic into lanes. It is an exercise that 
relies on understanding the very volume of space, and the sea as liquid, wet and motionful 
(following Steinberg and Peters 2015).  
 
From lines to conduits: Creating 3D Dover Strait flow-space 
There are now over 400 TSS or maritime motorways world-wide. These routeing schemes 
underscore the movements of containerised and bulk vessels, ensuring they travel with 
maximum efficiency, avoiding the risks that are associated with particular global waterways. 
The Dover Strait was the first of these schemes and provided the blueprint for all which would 
follow. This ‘blueprint’ functions by way of setting out the concept of ‘traffic separation’ and 
the rules under which it must operate in international shipping straits. However, each motorway 
is also very different, with the specific route determined by the geophysical traits of a given 
passage (its twists, turns, bends, length), the topography or bathymetry of the seabed (depth 
and its character), meteorological and tidal conditions, the volume of shipping and so on. These 
will each impact the exact motorway ‘route’, devised and implemented in a given ‘volume’ of 
water.  
The Dover Strait became the testing-space for the first motorway routeing scheme 
because of its unique conditions. As Kaimes Beasley of the Maritime Coastguard Agency 
stated ‘when you look at the reasons why a Traffic Separation Scheme was established in the 
first instance’, it was because it met a distinct ‘set of criteria’ (Interview 2016). The Dover 
Strait is narrow, busy, has changeable weather, is prone to fog, and it has hidden, subsurface 
dangers (Kaimes Beasley MCA, Interview 2016). Unofficial forms of routeing have long 
existed in the Channel, for example, the ‘Nemedri Routes’, which are a set of passages through 
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the Channel that had been ‘mine swept’ following both World Wars, to create safe (sub/surface) 
passage for vessels in respect of the threat of unexploded bombs. Yet the advent of larger ships 
and busier seas would make formalised routeing in maritime bottlenecks more urgent.  
 In 1967, Britain – and indeed the world – faced the worst maritime incident ever 
witnessed when the SS Torrey Canyon, a Suezmax Class oil tanker which could carry 120,000 
tons of crude oil, struck the shallow Seven Stones reef near the Isles of Scilly, where it was 
grounded and then broke up, spilling its load (Oudet 1972). This was a disaster due to specific 
subsurface, invisible hazards. On colliding with the reef, the spill from the vessel reached far 
and wide, contaminating the coast and killing many thousands of seabirds and other marine life 
(ibid. 1972). As Captain Oudet, who would later be pivotal in the design of TSS/maritime 
motorway stated, 
 
Torrey Canyon was sailing in dangerous waters where she had no business to be. It 
was suggested that tankers and other very large ships should be confined to routes free 
from danger, that the courses actually made good should be properly checked and that 
speed limits should be imposed. (Oudet 1972, 56)  
 
 The need for routeing through the Channel and Dover Strait gained momentum 
following this disaster. As early as 1959, Captain Oudet had set out an agenda for the need to 
consider the routing of traffic in the Straits of Dover/Pas De Calais (National Archives BT 
243/177). But in the 1960s this effort was directed through the work of the Royal Institute of 
Navigation (RIN). Discussions were held by a pan-European Working Group lead by Michael 
Richey, director of the RIN, together with interested parties from across Europe, primarily the 
Britain, France and what was then West Germany. The Working Group was an independent 
committee who aimed to deliver established and agreed proposals to respective governments 
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and thereafter to the International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) for 
implementation. Given the political contestation over sea-space – and Britain’s desire to not 
encroach the freedom of navigation at sea (Peters 2011) – governments were content to take a 
backseat until a suitable proposal for Channel routeing presented itself to them. The outcome 
was an optional TSS, aimed to recommend motorway routes to seafarers based on the system 
of two channels – south-west and north-east – creating single-flow traffic lanes, and crucially 
lanes that avoided the treacherous shallow banks such as Sandettié and Varne (see National 
Archives BT 243 files). Indeed, by 1962 alone, when the world was opening up to improved 
flows of efficiency through containerised and bulk shipping via larger ships with deeper 
draughts, over 80% of shipping through-traffic in the Channel navigated an area of less than 5 
miles wide because of such sub-surface hazards (National Archives BT 243/177). As such, the 
TSS designed by the Working Group was not a design of lines etched onto a map and on to the 
sea. It was the carving of a safe conduit through the very volume of space. 
 Whilst optional, the Dover scheme presented few issues in light of who would oversee 
its use. Being optional meant there was no mechanism to record a contravention or put in place 
a penalty for incorrect usage. Whilst some ships did voyage in the new, recommended way, 
collisions still occurred (see the 520.02 files series held by RIN). The threat of subsurface 
hazards would become evident again in 1971 when, on the evening of Monday 11th January, a 
serious maritime collision occurred in the Dover Strait, six miles offshore from Folkestone. 
The Panamanian registered motor vessel Texaco Caribbean, weighing in at 13,604 gross tonnes 
and set for Trindad with ballast collided ‘about seven miles off Folkestone... with the Peruvian 
vessel Paracras (9,481) which was eastbound on a voyage from Pisco in Peru to Rotterdam’ 
(Lane 1996, 3, from the Dover Local Studies Collection, D38). The ‘result was an enormous 
explosion which tore the tanker in half and rocked homes from Dungeness to Margate’ (ibid. 
1996, 3). The Paracras was taken by tow to safety, but the Texaco Caribbean would be lost. 
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After the incident the vessel laid, part sub-merged and over the course of 10 hours sank – in 
two separate parts – ‘right in the middle of the main shipping lane at a point where it was at its 
narrowest due to the Varne sandbank’ (ibid. 1996, 4). In the dim and fog-obscured morning 
light on the 12th January, unable to see the part-submerged wreckage of the previous day, the 
German vessel Brandenburg was involved in a further collision with this subsurface hazard 
(National Archives, FCO 76/252). The vessel was to sink in the vicinity of the earlier accidents 
and all 21 crew members died2.  
 The 1971 incidents resulted in a growing momentum for routeing through the Dover 
Strait that would prevent such accidents occurring. Crucial would be a shift from an optional 
scheme directing travel, to a mandatory system of lanes. Yet making such a scheme 
compulsory raised new, contentious geopolitical questions over who was responsible for ocean 
space and who could rightfully impose penal provisions if such a scheme was contravened. If 
penalties were enforced by the nation-state adjacent to the sea where the scheme was located, 
observed and monitored – and over a ship of a different national flag – this would be tantamount 
to an extension of sovereign state powers into the international space of the sea. As the topic 
of TSS shifted from the RIN to the government, matters of routeing remained concerned not 
just with ‘surface’ matters, but with complexities that were far deeper.  
 
A geopolitical struggle: Making mandatory deep routeing 
Directing vessels in a mandatory fashion by means of lanes, predicated on circumnavigating 
hidden underwater hazards and separating out traffic (much akin to aerial separation, see Lin 
2018), was a key concern of the governments of Britain and France who needed to ensure the 
                                                          
2 Little over a month later the Greek tanker Niki would collide with this wreck, hidden on the sea floor. A further 
22 seafarers died. This succession of accidents was the worse set of maritime casualties in the Dover Strait 
during peace time. It remains to this day, the largest loss of life post-World War Two in the Channel. 
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scheme was adhered to, but did not want to be seen to impose orders to ships flagged to, and 
thus extensions of, non-British and French territories (Benton 2009). Such ordering would be 
an extension of state power to the ‘high seas’ (see also Peters 2011). As the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) reported to the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) ‘issues might arise in making the 
current optional use of traffic lanes mandatory in view of territorial claims over water’ (Memo 
correspondence, 28th January 1971, National Archives FCO 76/ 252). As Mr Campbell of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) warned a few days later, ‘a mandatory reporting 
scheme’ (where Britain or France monitor and report on contravening vessels) might be 
considered as ‘unilateral extensions of British and French sovereignty over the Channel. 
Although the British government are not thinking in these terms’ it may well be deemed that 
they are (Memo correspondence, 28th January, National Archives FCO 76 252). The British 
and French were concerned at exercising control deep into another territorial domain – that of 
the ‘free seas’. To alleviate this concern, they devised a surveillance system that would allow 
traffic to be ‘monitored’ by the British and French from radar stations either side of the Strait, 
with operators referring any contravention of route usage to the flag nation of the ship. This 
deferred responsibility to the nation-state for which the ship was registered. Such a method of 
enacting control removed any doubt that Britain or France sought to make sovereign claims via 
3D TSS zones or through wet, liquid, motorway routes. 
  Yet there was a second matter to resolve. The Dover Strait was not (and is not) just a 
space of (sub)surface flows of transportation. Other activities aside from ‘transiting’ occur – 
notably fishing. The English Channel, North Sea, and Dover Strait have long been important 
fishing grounds and political resistance followed with concern from organisations that their 
access to this underwater resource would be limited with the imposition of mandatory lanes. 





Traffic Regulation … would greatly interfere with the Drift net fishing for Herrings of 
the English and Scottish Herring Drifters …. The East bound route covers practically 
all the North and West Hinder grounds, Sandettié and Outer Ruytingen grounds and  a 
large part of the fishing area near Cape Gris Nez. (Letter from Mr Catchpole to the 
Working Group, March 1963, National Archives BT 243/178) 
 
Later in 1968 (National Archives BT 243/611) and again in 1971 (National Archives FCO 
76/254) the rights of fishers to their subsurface catch was again ‘raised’. As Bear and Eden 
note, fish move underwater and fail to respect boundaries (2008). Catch would move into and 
out of the TSS zone, through the motorway lanes. In 1968 Mr Parker of the Ministry of 
Transport (MoT) noted that there may be the need to ‘flexibility’ in the rigid scheme of 
routeing,  
 
…fishing vessels… pleasure vessels and similar craft should avoid hampering vessels 
using Traffic Separation Schemes… At the session we somewhat tentatively suggested 
that some flexibility might be injected …. We thought we might be in the minority … 
but to our surprise a number of delegates expressed the view (that this was) 
discriminatory against certain classes of vessels. (Mr Parker, report of the 6th session 
of the IMCO Safety of Navigation Committee, National Archives BT 243/611) 
 
Given the complexities regarding fishing, the regulations for routeing as eventually set out in 
the guiding document for TSS ‘The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea’ 
(or ‘COLREGs’) (initially 1972, latest amendment 2008), paid special attention to the rights of 




2.8    Vessels fishing within a Scheme are considered to be using the Scheme, and must 
comply with the general requirements set out in Rules 10(b) and (c)3, however, when 
fishing in a separation zone they may follow any course.   
 
2.9    The requirement that vessels fishing must not impede the passage of traffic passing 
through a TSS, means that they must not operate in such a manner that neither they, nor 
their gear, seriously restricts the sea room available to other vessels within a lane, and 
must take early and substantial action to avoid any risk of collision developing. 
(COLREGS, in Marine Guidance Note 364, 2008, 2)  
 
Accordingly, having debated issues at ‘depth’ the proposal for mandatory routeing was adopted 
for agreement by the International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO, now known as 
the IMO) in 1972 and laid down in international collision regulations (COLREGS rule 10) and 
in national-level maritime guidance notes world-over.  
 But the scheme devised in the 1970s is still subject to amendment and depth has been 
crucial to ‘tweaks’ and ‘additions’ to the Dover TSS. Again, as early as 1968, there had been 
concern that some aspects of the routes proposed would have ‘insufficient deep water’ to 
facilitate the transit of the largest, deep-draught vessels (letter from Mr Parker of the MoT to 
Mr Tordjman (his counterpart in France), 10th September 1968, National Archives BT 
                                                          
3Rule (b) states ‘a vessel using a traffic separation scheme shall:  (i) proceed in the appropriate traffic lane in the 
general direction of traffic flow for  that lane; (ii) so far as practicable keep clear of a traffic separation line or 
separation zone; (iii) normally join or leave a traffic lane at the termination of the lane, but when  joining or 
leaving from either side shall do so at as small an angle to the general  direction of traffic flow as practicable’ 
(COLREGS 2008, 7). Rule (c) states ‘a vessel shall, so far as practicable, avoid crossing traffic lanes but if obliged 





243/611). In 1970, Mr Ordman of the Port of London Authority, would write to the DTI 
regarding the ‘reversal’ of TSS routing which some were in favour of ‘because under the 
present routeing very deep-drafted ships bound for Holland or Germany have to pass east of 
Sandettié … with the increase in drafts of tankers greater depths of water area required than 
hitherto. Owing to sand-wave formation east of Sandettié, the depths required are not available’ 
(14th December 1970, National Archives BT 243/613). As a ‘Forum’ article from the Journal 
of the Institute of Navigation relayed,  
 
…the requirements for safe navigation of ships now in service [in 1970] bear little 
resemblance to the requirements of 1964, when the present routes were formulated. One 
of the main difficulties have been that of the dramatic increase in draught but this was 
predictable and should have been allowed for, indeed, Lloyds had anticipated draughts 
of 72ft for 250,000 ton ships before routing started…. Bearing in mind that tonnages 
and draughts will inevitably increase in the future, the requirements of the deep inwards 
ship must be given first consideration. (October 1970, National Archives BT 243/613) 
 
Although there was much discussion of route ‘reversals’ in the Dover Strait to account for ship 
routeing of larger, deeper-draught vessels, a ‘Note by the Government of the Netherlands’ on 
the navigation of deep-draught ships through the Dover Strait would argue, along with the 
Working Group of the RIN, that ‘a radical change in the routeing system of Dover Strait is not 
desirable, The general traffic pattern in the area in question is working satisfactorily’ (see also 
National Archives file series FCO 76). The Netherlands note went on to state that ‘the 
conclusion was reached that it is desirable to establish for vessels with a draught in excess of 
55 feet a route West of the Sandettié bank’. Indeed, the development of a DWR or ‘Deep Water 
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Route’ would be established for the transit of ‘ultra’ sized vessels ensuring their safe passage. 
This is now set out in COLREGS, 
 
4.9 The main traffic lane for NE-bound traffic lies to the SE of the Sandettié Bank and 
should be followed by all such ships as can safely navigate therein having regard to 
their draught.  
 
4.10   The deep-water route to the NW of the Sandettié Bank is intended for use by 
vessels with a draught of 16 metres or more. Masters considering using this route should 
take into account the  proximity  of  traffic  using  the  SW-bound  lane. Through traffic 
to which this consideration does not apply should, if practicable, avoid using the deep-
water route. (COLREGS, in Marine Guidance Note 364, 2008, 5, see also UK 
Hydrographic Office Dover Strait DWR, 2013). 
 
Paving the way below: Voyaging toward conclusions 
The Maritime Coastguard Agency at Dover, along with colleagues in Gris Nez, France, 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, now ensure the ‘proper’ usage of lanes in the Strait (Visit to MCA, 
July 2016). They operate in such a way that does not interfere with the authority of the ships’ 
captain, or with the legal status of the maritime motorway in international waters. They do so 
through a process of observing, monitoring and reporting on traffic entering the Dover Traffic 
Separation Scheme. They ensure mandatory compliance through operating an information 
service to seafarers, alerting them to any dangers they may face in the Channel: a broken-down 
vessel, poor visibility hidden risks below the surface, and so on. They also operate a system 
whereby ships must report to operators at Dover, outlining their intent in transiting the Strait. 
Once in the lane, they must abide to regulations set out in COLREGS that govern the flow of 
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traffic. The route allows ships to avoid key shallow areas that litter the Strait, and to proceed 
safely and smoothly through the Channel in the same direction as other traffic. Operators watch 
the traffic, diligently, expertly, pre-emptively (following Anderson 2010), through a 
combination of radar and AIS data, anticipating vessel movements in relation to each other, 
and areas of hidden depth – the Varne Bank being one notable one – providing information that 
can prevent collisions (Visit to MCA, July 2016). The screen from which operators observe 
and monitor ‘may look flat, its icons two-dimensional, but they mark a three-dimensional 
world, indicating patches of weather above the seas surface, and sandbanks and wrecks below 
it’ (Visit to MCA, July 2016).  
If a ship fails to check in with the relevant coastal authority, or a vessel contravenes the 
rules of roads – a report is logged. To this day, this system works. As Kaimes Beasley from the 
Maritime Coastguard Agency would note,  
 
you can say, now it is in place that there is a massive reduction in the number of 
collisions (and)… that is down to a number of factors – a combination of the number 
of improvements to the regulatory regime for safety and an improvement in the 
technology we have at our disposal. But it is also the Traffic Separation Scheme in 
reducing the chance of collision. (Interview 2016) 
 
This has also been confirmed in official surveys of Channel usage. As early as 1977, a series 
of surveys by the Anglo French Safety of Navigation Group (AFSONG) set up to study the 
behaviour of Channel traffic noted, 
 
A substantial reduction in casualty figures and the acceptance by the mariner of 
disciplined use of the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme has resulted… (the) 
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extended research (of Britain and France) contributed much to this achievement 
(AFSONG, Study of Marine Traffic in the English Channel June 1977, 1, RIN 
Archives, 520.02/11) 
 
Routeing, in sum, has been crucial to the efficient, safe and secure movement of vessels 
through the Dover Strait. In relaying the history of ‘Channel’ routeing and the making of a 
maritime motorway this paper has aimed to achieve two goals. First, to add depth – or volume 
– to predominantly surficial studies of routeing, and second, to centralise the study of routeing 
per se in geographical analysis where it has been overlooked in favour of the highly visual and 
firmly material markers of the global economy – ‘ships’ and ‘stuff’ (see for example George 
2013; Heins 2015; Martin 2016; Parker 2015).  
Routeing, as has been demonstrated, is not secondary to ships and cargo as a key driver 
of global trade and commerce. Rather it is the underlying ‘invisible infrastructure’ – or route 
(Peters 2016) that secures the movement that is fundamental to the globalised world. This paper 
has illustrated what might be learned by approaching these vital routes through the framework 
of a ‘wet’, three-dimensional’ spatial ontology (Steinberg and Peters 2015). It has showed how 
ship routeing is not a purely surficial exercise of charting a voyage across seas, oceans and 
waterways, but rather, routes are predicted at times, on the water’s depth in relation to surface. 
Routes are devised by thinking of space as voluminous. The topography of the ocean floor and 
seabed, as well as the underwater resources at stake in maritime space all matter to processes 
of routeing. Likewise, early, pre-industrial routes were determined not just as lines on a map, 
but by spherical, voluminous planetary conditions of wind speed and direction which would 
drive sails. In this example of ‘deep routeing’ and the making of maritime motorways, thinking 
beyond surface and with volume has been essential in matters of governance, to ensure vessel 
safety and security so that movement doesn’t ground to a halt and the economy with it.  
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Whilst the Dover Strait is an important example – the space where one of the most 
pivotal formalised routeing measures was formulated and developed – other examples 
demonstrate the central place of managing and governing the transit of vessels to ensure they 
safely and securely move from A to B. In 2010, for example, the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) began a consultation regarding the implementation of a TSS routeing scheme for the 
Bering Strait, a stretch of water between the north western tip of Alaska and Russia, argued to 
offer a new, globally significant passageway for vessels with the advent of ice melt (Huntington 
et al. 2015). Yet the process has been slow. This is in part due to concerns over a rigid vessel 
traffic scheme in a ‘dynamic’ maritime area (Captain Ed Page, Marine Exchange Alaska, 
Interview 2016). ‘Indigenous’ fishing is conducted in the area which falls across suggested 
‘motorway’ paths, and ice melt – and particularly the presence of floes – can cause mobile 
hazards under and above the water. As such, any routeing must account for these subsurface 
considerations. As the Director of the Marine Exchange stated,  
 
And so if your route, your channel that you describe is right where the ice is, they (the 
captains) are going to go one side or the other, they’re not going to go through the ice 
… sometimes there is a whale, a pod of whales, or whalers for that matter … (So) what 
I think is more appropriate, in light of the new technology that we now have going 
forward … I think for the Bering Strait, which is forty eight miles wide, what you really 
want us to identify is ‘Areas to be Avoided’. (Captain Ed Page, Marine Exchange 
Alaska, Interview 2016) 
 
A dynamic ‘Area to be Avoided’ refers to a specific ‘known’ zone seafarers should not passage 
through (leaving the remainder of sea-space for navigation by the Captain, as is deemed 
suitable). It is a method of governing the route of vessels away from dangers but not 
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determining the route as rigidly as a motorway. Even this mode of routeing, however, is 
determined by not just an areal, flat, zone or ‘area’ on a map. It is established by an 
understanding of depth, of volume and of the sea as dynamic and mobile (following Steinberg 
and Peters 2015) in order to route vessels away from hazards. A scheme also predicated on 
depth has been implemented in New Zealand to prevent the strikes of whales as large vessels 
enter the Hauraki Gulf. This has been achieved by creating points enroute where vessels must 
‘slow’ their passageway through the water into port (see Constantine et al. 2015). Notably, 
such ‘Areas to be Avoided’, route-speed restrictions and TSS are typically represented on 
maps, as a pink, flat channels or zones. Yet these are anything but flat. Schemes are carefully 
designed to manage oceanic volume, circumnavigating ships around hidden geophysical 
dangers, marine life, the dangers of submerged wrecks, as well as reducing the dangers of a 
head-on collision.  
This paper has thus challenged considerations of ship routeing that only skim the 
surface. Yet much more work is needed to understand routeing and how depth plays a part in 
the global passageways that are as fundamental to making global mobilities as containers, cargo 
and the vessels that shift them. How, for example, are changes in sea-level rise monitored and 
what does this mean for changes to the viability of global shipping? How might deep-sea 
mining and also underwater nuclear testing alter the pathways of ships? What governance is 
necessary, or even desirable for underwater research and military vessels? This paper has 
argued that ship routeing is not purely surficial exercise of charting a voyage across seas and 
oceans. Routes have a geo-politics predicted at times, on the water’s depth, it volume, its 
movement, the topography of the ocean floor and seabed and marine resources. It is time, 
therefore, to deepen and bring a wet ontological awareness to understandings of the vital work 
of routeing measures for improving the safety of life at sea for human, and non-human entities. 
This paper has argued that a recognition and discussion of deep routeing is necessary to shed 
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light upon the governance of the ocean and the invisible processes – and invisible 
infrastructures such as maritime motorways – that underscore the global logistics flows vital to 
society and the economy. 
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